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‘Keep the Indonesian Pot Boiling’:
Western Covert Intervention in
Indonesia, October 1965–March 1966
David Easter
This study examines the role played by the West in the destruction of the Indonesian
communist party, the PKI, and the removal of the radical Indonesian president, Sukarno,
in 1965–66. After the murder of six generals in October 1965 the Indonesian army
massacred thousands of communists and seized power from Sukarno. The United States
secretly helped the army in this period by providing intelligence, arms, medicines and
radios and by giving assurances that Britain would not attack Indonesia while the army
was suppressing the PKI. The US, Britain, Australia and Malaysia also used propaganda
to encourage hostility in Indonesia towards the PKI. The article assesses the impact of
Western covert intervention and concludes that Western propaganda may have
encouraged the mass killings of the communists.
The changes that took place in Indonesia from October 1965 to March 1966 were a
watershed in the history of South-East Asia and a major reverse for communism in the
Cold War. Prior to October 1965 Indonesia was a radical Third World state. Its
charismatic president, Sukarno, was a vocal anti-imperialist, dedicated to resisting
what he called the Nekolim (neo-colonialists-imperialists) of the West. Sukarno openly
aligned himself with the communist bloc in this struggle, proclaiming support for the
North Vietnamese in the Vietnam War, establishing close ties with the People’s
Republic of China and angrily pulling Indonesia out of the United Nations in January
1965. Sukarno also tried to destabilize his pro-Western neighbour Malaysia through a
campaign called ‘Confrontation’. He denounced Malaysia as a British neo-colonialist
creation and sponsored a guerrilla insurgency in the country. To leaders in
Washington, London and Canberra, Sukarno appeared to be mounting a
comprehensive challenge to Western interests in South-East Asia.
In internal affairs Sukarno was also moving Indonesia to the left. For many years
there had been an uneasily balanced triangle of power in the country between Sukarno,
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the staunchly anti-communist army and the large Indonesian communist party, the
PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia). During 1964–65 Sukarno increasingly favoured the
PKI. Government propaganda campaigns created a siege mentality by warning of
Nekolim ‘encirclement’ of Indonesia and alleging American Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) plots to assassinate Sukarno. The president banned rival political parties
to the PKI or allowed them to be taken over by the leftists. He also permitted the
communists to gain control over most of the press and the Antara news agency.
It appeared that Sukarno, who was 64 years old and known to be in ill health, was
creating the conditions for the PKI to take control in Indonesia after his death. Such an
outcome would have been a major defeat for the West as Indonesia was a glittering
geo-strategic prize. With a population of 103 million it was one of largest countries in
world, it had abundant raw materials and the sprawling Indonesian island chain
covered vital sea lanes. The loss of Indonesia would also outflank American efforts to
contain communism in South Vietnam.
Events in the winter of 1965–66 completely transformed the situation. An abortive
coup took place in Jakarta on 1 October, which, although unsuccessful, caused the
death of six leading army generals. The Indonesian army blamed the coup attempt on
the PKI and it retaliated with a ferocious campaign of repression against the party.
An estimated 300,000–500,000 people were killed in an anti-communist Terror
and the PKI was extinguished as a political force. The army leader, Suharto, then
compelled Sukarno in March 1966 to hand over executive powers to him in what was
effectively a military coup. Under Suharto’s leadership Indonesia moved sharply to
the right, both domestically and internationally, making peace with Malaysia and
breaking ties with China. Sukarno was marginalized and died while under house
arrest in 1970.
This ‘reverse course’ in Indonesia was an important victory for the Western powers
in the Cold War. It removed the spectre of a communist Indonesia and ended
Sukarno’s troublesome anti-Malaysia campaign. Since the West was such an obvious
beneficiary of the reverse course, there has been speculation as to whether the Western
powers were actually responsible for it.1 Peter Dale Scott has argued that the events of
1965–66 were in fact ‘a three phase right-wing coup – one which had been both
publicly encouraged and secretly assisted by U.S. spokesmen and officials’.2 Scott sees
Suharto as the puppet master behind the reverse course, ‘inducing, or at a minimum
helping to induce’ the October 1965 coup attempt and then using it as pretext to
eliminate the PKI and remove Sukarno. In this conspiracy Scott believes Suharto had
strong covert support from the United States, especially in areas like propaganda and
secret aid to the Indonesian army. By contrast, the historian H.W. Brands has argued
that Washington was not to blame for the changes in Indonesia.3 Examining the
documentary sources Brands could find no evidence of American links to the October
1965 coup attempt and he claims that the United States only gave cautious and limited
support to the army in the subsequent power struggle. In short, he thinks that
‘Sukarno’s overthrow had little to do with American machinations. It resulted instead
from developments of essentially Indonesian origin’.4
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Other writers have focused on Britain’s role.5 The journalists Paul Lashmar and
James Oliver claim in their book Britain’s Secret Propaganda War that ‘the British
government secretly helped overthrow President Sukarno of Indonesia, assisting the
rise of General Suharto . . . to power’.6 Lashmar and Oliver draw on interviews with
former Foreign Office officials to show that London mounted a covert propaganda
campaign against Sukarno after the October 1965 coup attempt. However, Lashmar
and Oliver provide little documentary proof and they also make bold claims about
earlier Western plotting against Sukarno which are not supported by the evidence.7
This article will seek to answer the question of whether the West was responsible for
the reverse course in Indonesia. Using British, Australian and American sources it will
examine the covert role played by the West in the destruction of the Indonesian
communist party and the ousting of Sukarno.
By the summer of 1965 there was a consensus amongst Britain, the United States,
Australia and Malaysia, that Sukarno was an implacable enemy, threatening the
stability of the region and leading his country to communism. Both the British and the
Americans believed that the longer Sukarno remained in power the greater chance
there was of a communist takeover in Indonesia after his death.8
The Western powers responded to this threat in a similar way: by using propaganda
and covert action. For the three Commonwealth powers the immediate problem was
Confrontation. Britain and Australia had committed substantial forces to defend
Malaysia but for political reasons they were reluctant to openly retaliate for the
Indonesian guerrilla raids. If, for example, the British and Australians bombed targets
in Indonesia it would confirm to the Indonesian public Sukarno’s warnings about the
threat posed by the Nekolim. An open war between Britain, Australia and Indonesia
could strengthen the position of the PKI and damage the prestige of the army,
hastening moves towards a communist takeover. The Commonwealth allies therefore
had to rely on covert pressures to make Indonesia halt Confrontation; British and
Australian soldiers secretly crossed the jungle border to attack guerrilla units inside
Indonesia and Britain and Malaysia gave aid to rebel groups in the outer Indonesian
islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi.9
In addition, the British and Malaysians used covert propaganda to erode support for
Confrontation and encourage disunity in Indonesia.10 In February 1965 the
Information Research Department of the Foreign Office, which specialized in
unattributable propaganda, set up the South East Asia Monitoring Unit in Singapore
to carry out propaganda directed at Indonesian audiences.11 London instructed that
the propaganda from Singapore should undermine the will of the Indonesian armed
forces to attack Malaysia, by representing that their real enemies were the PKI and
communist China. Propaganda should also ‘Discredit any potential successor to
Sukarno . . . whose accession to power might benefit the PKI’.12 In July the Foreign
Office decided to step up its propaganda operations by appointing a Political Warfare
Coordinator in Singapore. Norman Reddaway, the Regional Information Officer in
Beirut, was selected for the position, although Reddaway would not take up the post
until November.13 Malaysian propaganda against Sukarno and the PKI was
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disseminated overtly, through Radio Malaysia’s external broadcasts to Indonesia, and
covertly, through a ‘black’ radio station, ‘Radio Free Indonesia’, which masqueraded as
the work of Indonesian e´migre´s.14
The United States’ primary concern was the communist threat. In March 1965 the
303 Committee of the National Security Council approved a CIA–State Department
political action programme to reduce the influence of the PKI and communist China
and support non-communist elements in Indonesia.15 As part of the programme the
US would ‘develop black and grey propaganda themes for use within Indonesia and via
appropriate media assets outside Indonesia’.16 The aim would be to ‘Portray the PKI as
an increasingly ambitious, dangerous opponent of Sukarno and legitimate
nationalism and instrument of Chinese neo-imperialism’. The next month the United
States effectively abandoned any attempt to work with Sukarno. The veteran American
diplomat Ellsworth Bunker visited Sukarno in April but he could find no common
ground – he came back convinced that the Indonesian leader ‘was a Marxist at heart’.17
Bunker warned President Lyndon Johnson that the large and widespread American
presence in Indonesia gave the PKI political targets to attack and allowed it to portray
those who were friendly to the US, such as the army, as defenders and stooges of the
imperialists. He therefore recommended that ‘U.S. visibility should be reduced so that
those opposed to the communists and extremists may be free to handle a
confrontation, which they believe will come, without the incubus of being attacked as
defenders of the neo-colonialists and imperialists’.18 The Americans should quietly
keep in contact with ‘the constructive elements of strength in Indonesia’ and try to give
these elements ‘the most favourable conditions for confrontation [with the PKI]’,
although Bunker thought that Indonesia ‘would essentially have to save itself ’.
Washington put Bunker’s recommendations into effect and adopted what one
American official described as a ‘low silhouette’ policy.19 American diplomats and aid
workers were pulled out and the visible US presence reduced. At the same time
Washington tried to find ways to influence opinion in Indonesia. Plans were drawn up
to improve Voice of America (VOA)’s signal to Indonesia by erecting ten transmitters
at Clark Field air base in the Philippines.20 In August US officials also held talks with
the Australians in Canberra to discuss possible cooperation in broadcasts to
Indonesia.21
It is clear, then, that by September 1965 the Western powers were hostile to
Indonesia and trying to use propaganda to combat the PKI. But it was the coup
attempt in Indonesia that gave them a real opportunity to do this. In the early hours of
1 October a group headed by Lieutenant Colonel Untung, a left-wing commander in
the Presidential Guard, abducted and killed six leading Indonesian generals. Untung’s
troops also took over broadcasting facilities in Jakarta and announced the formation
of a Revolutionary Council.
The Untung putsch swiftly collapsed. Its armed bands failed to capture the Defence
Minister, General Naustion, although they did manage to fatally injure his six-year-old
daughter, and Major General Suharto, commander of the army’s strategic reserves,
used his troops to regain control of the capital and crush the plotters. By 2 October
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the coup was effectively over. What was less easily resolved and which remains a
mystery to this day, is whether Untung was acting on behalf of other forces. There has
been a welter of conflicting theories as to who was behind the coup attempt.22 Some on
the right have blamed the PKI, Red China, the pro-communist Indonesian Foreign
Minister Subandrio or even Sukarno. Others, such as Scott, have constructed an
elaborate conspiracy theory that the coup attempt was an army provocation, led by
Suharto, to give a pretext for a crack-down on the communists.
There is insufficient space here to assess all the conflicting theories of the coup’s
origins but looking at American, British and Australian primary sources it is
apparent that despite their interest in covert action and propaganda, the Western
powers were surprised by the coup attempt. In the first few days of October
American, Australian and British diplomats in Jakarta were shocked and confused
and had trouble in finding out what was going on.23 There is no evidence that the
coup attempt was a Western-backed army provocation. Indeed, on 1 October the
American Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, told George
Ball at the State Department that the CIA ‘had had absolutely nothing to do with
it’.24 The immediate suspicion of Western officials was of a possible connection to
the PKI.25
Yet evidence for PKI involvement in the coup was not clear-cut. Communist
transport and communications unions helped Untung on 1 October by cutting
communications in and out of Jakarta and the next day a communist newspaper
endorsed the action he had taken. The coup attempt was centred on the Halim air
force base and made use of communist cadres being given military training there. But
the PKI did not try to mobilize its massive party membership behind the coup and an
American ‘clandestine source’ reported that the PKI central committee only decided to
give Untung military support after hearing his radio broadcast on 1 October.26 After
the coup had failed the PKI denied any involvement and claimed it had been an
internal army matter, with junior officers attacking senior officers.
Faced with this conflicting evidence, privately Western policymakers were uncertain
how far the PKI was responsible for the abortive coup. US State Department officials
believed that the PKI had not planned or engineered the coup attempt.27 Instead they
thought that Untung, without consulting the party, might have put into effect a
communist contingency plan to seize power on the death of Sukarno. Certainly there
had been a flurry of reports in August–September that the president was seriously ill
and these could have sparked Untung into action. Once the coup was underway the
PKI felt it had no choice but to get on board. Sir Andrew Gilchrist, the British
Ambassador in Jakarta, suspected that the communists only became aware of Untung’s
plan at a late stage and joined in because they feared that if the army crushed Untung it
would crush them as well.28 The Australian Joint Intelligence Committee noted that
while individual communist groups clearly participated in the coup, ‘evidence of
actual PKI involvement – that is of prior planning by the Central Committee – is
largely circumstantial’.29 By contrast, Marshall Green, the US Ambassador to
Indonesia, was convinced that party chairman Aidit and other top PKI leaders ‘were
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almost certainly in on planning’ the coup although he conceded that the ‘PKI decision
to participate seems to have been hurried one’.30
If Western policymakers were unsure about the role of the communists the
Indonesian army appeared to have no doubts and it pressed Sukarno for strong action
against the PKI. However, the president tried to protect the PKI and he refused to ban
the party. He promised a peaceful political settlement and called for national unity,
warning that division would only benefit the Nekolim. Reportedly at a cabinet meeting
on 6 October Sukarno and Subandrio blamed the coup attempt on the CIA and alleged
that the CIA’s aim was to spread confusion before an American and British invasion of
Indonesia.31
The army, though, was not diverted by Sukarno’s appeals for unity and it began to
move against the PKI. It arrested communist cadres and encouraged anti-PKI
demonstrations in Jakarta. It also tried to mobilize public opinion by taking control of
the mass media.32 The army closed down the communist press while ensuring the
continued publication of military newspapers such as Angkatan Bersendjada, Berita
Yudha and the English language Jakarta Daily Mail. It took control over Radio
Indonesia and the Antara news agency, which was the main supplier of news carried by
Indonesian radio stations and newspapers.
Through these outlets the army attacked the PKI and linked it to Untung’s coup
attempt. On 4 October an editorial in Angkatan Bersendjada lambasted the PKI as
‘devils’ who were ‘injecting poison into the Indonesian nation and the revolution’.33
Two days later the paper claimed the coup attempt was masterminded by the PKI and
called on the government to declare the party illegal.34 One prominent theme in this
propaganda campaign was the murder of the six Indonesian generals. The army-
controlled media alleged that members of the PKI youth organization, Pemuda Rakjat,
and the communist women’s group, Gerwani, had brutally tortured the generals
before killing them.35 For example, on 10 October Berita Yudha reported that the
generals’ eyes had been gouged out. These claims were untrue. Although the generals’
bodies had partially decomposed after being dumped in a well by the rebels, autopsies
showed they had not been tortured or mutilated after death.36 Nonetheless this story
became a central feature of the army’s propaganda campaign and a founding myth for
the later Suharto regime.
In mid-October Suharto seems to have given approval for army units to deal with
the PKI and the army rounded up and killed party members throughout the country.
It also armed nationalist and Muslim groups, such as the Ansor Muslim youth
organization, and encouraged them to eliminate the communists. The result was a
wave of mass killings, spreading across Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi and into Bali by
December and then onto Timor, Flores and Lombok.
News of the slaughter slowly reached Western diplomats in Jakarta, who had only
limited information on what was happening outside the capital. On 9 November an
Australian teacher returning from central Java reported ‘All manner of atrocities,
stakes through heads, eye gouging, live burials . . . being freely committed by both
sides’.37 On 14 November an American missionary told her embassy of the massacre of
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3,400 PKI activists by Ansor at Kediri, in East Java.38 An Indonesian source informed
the British air attache´ that PKI men and women were being executed in very large
numbers.39 Often they were given knives and told to kill themselves. If they refused
they were shot in the back. An American observer in Bali reported ‘many headless
bodies encountered on roads’ and a traveller in Sumatra saw Muslim youth group
members stop a bus, drag out numerous communist passengers and hack them to
death.40 In February 1966 a visiting Australian diplomat learnt that 250 PKI members
had been killed in the town of Kupang in Timor.41 He was told by the chief of the
Public Works Department in Kupang that
Torture was the customary prelude to death and was in fact carried out in the army
establishment next door to his own home. The nightly executions, carried out just
outside Kupang, were open to the public provided those who attended took part in
the executions. The Army was in complete control of these operations.
Precisely how many were killed in the massacres is not known and may never be
known. Estimates varied widely.42 In January 1966 Colonel Stamboul, an army liaison
officer, confided to the British military attaches that the army had no exact idea of the
death toll but he estimated 500,000. Others in the army put the figure far higher.
Major-General Adjie, the fiercely anti-communist commander of the Siliwangi
division in West Java, told the Australian military attache´ that nearly two million were
killed. Short of hard evidence Western governments were cautious on the scale of the
bloodletting. In April 1966 the State Department thought that around 300,000 had
died.43 Even so, the violence from October 1965 to January 1966 would still rank as
one of the largest mass killings of the twentieth century.
The army-controlled media in Indonesia did not report the massacres. Instead the
media stoked up hatred of the communists by portraying them as sadistic murderers,
intent on killing their opponents. It alleged that the coup attempt and the murder of
the generals had been only the start of the communists’ plans for a reign of terror.
Antara reported at the beginning of November that a list had been found in Garut of
the names of hundreds of government officials the PKI had planned to kill if the coup
had been a success.44 In December the news agency ran a story that Aidit had offered
party activists in Java 25 million rupiahs if they murdered more than 1,000 people on a
PKI black-list.45
Communist atrocity stories were also a prominent feature in the media.46 In
November Antara claimed that Pemuda Rakjat members in Sumatra had kidnapped
two youths and tortured them for five days, removing eyes and cutting off hands and
testicles, before killing them. Another Pemuda Rakjat gang in Sumatra was alleged to
have attacked Muslims praying on the bank of a river and again tortured and
murdered them. The moral depravity of the communists was emphasized in other
ways: Antara reported on 8 December that Aidit had encouraged the Gerwani and
Pemuda Rakjat killers of the generals to take part in ‘delirious sexual orgies’ for six
months before the coup.47 In December the Jakarta Daily Mail denounced the
communists as ‘mentally and morally perverted creatures who consider slander,
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abduction, mutilation and murder their way of life’.48 The paper declared that there
was no place for the PKI in God-fearing Indonesia and called on people to ‘Cast out
this spawn of hell root and branch’.
Such demonization of the PKI could only have fuelled the pogrom against the party.
This is certainly what Sukarno feared. The Indonesian president tried to protect the
communists from the massacres – he constantly called for calm and national unity,
condemned the killings and threatened to punish by death those who used force
against the PKI.49 He also repeatedly warned the press not to incite the public with
inflammatory articles and irresponsible reporting.50 Sukarno and Subandrio both
denied stories that the communists had tortured and mutilated the six generals during
the coup.51 They pointed out that the general’s death certificates had not mentioned
any ‘abnormalities’.
These efforts were in vain though. The army retained control of most of the media
and it ensured that Sukarno’s message did not get through to the Indonesian public.
Newspapers and Antara frequently failed to publish the text of speeches by the
president.52 Other papers, such as the Jakarta Daily Mail, carried commentaries which
distorted Sukarno’s remarks, to make them appear to add up to a case for destroying
the PKI.53 Sukarno was powerless in the face of the massacres.
During the period of repression the West gave covert support to the army. The
Western powers had been greatly heartened by the events in Indonesia after 1 October.
A real chance had appeared to smash the PKI and perhaps remove Sukarno, and the
West was anxious that the army leaders fully seized the opportunity. As both the
Australian and American embassies put it in telegrams on 5 October, it was ‘now or
never’ for the army.54 The key question was how the West could best encourage and
help Suharto and Nasution. Any overt support was likely to be counterproductive as
Sukarno and Subandrio would immediately denounce Nekolim interference in
Indonesia. The West would therefore have to be circumspect in its approach.
For Green the priority was to smear the PKI’s image through propaganda. On 5
October the ambassador had urged Washington to ‘Spread the story of PKI’s guilt,
treachery and brutality’, adding that this was ‘perhaps the most needed immediate
assistance we can give army if we can find way to do it without identifying it as sole or
largely US effort’.55 The State Department agreed. It had already begun a VOA and
information programme connecting the PKI to the coup attempt.56 Green appeared
satisfied with the results. He cabled Washington on 7 November ‘that VOA doing good
job’.57 There are also indications that the CIA carried out covert anti-PKI propaganda
after the coup.58
The Australians were also active in this field. After 1 October the Department of
External Affairs gave daily guidance to Radio Australia over its broadcasts to
Indonesia.59 The Department stressed that Radio Australia should not give
information to the Indonesian people that the army-controlled internal media
would withhold, such as disavowals by the PKI of responsibility for the coup. Instead
the station should highlight reports discrediting the PKI and showing its involvement
in the Untung coup attempt. The station seems to have faithfully followed these
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guidelines, for Keith Shann, the Australian Ambassador in Jakarta, was pleased with
Radio Australia’s output, describing it as ‘generally good’.60
For their part the Malaysians tried to blame the putsch on the communists and
inflame popular feeling in Indonesia. For example, on 13 October a news
commentator on Radio Malaysia read out an editorial from the Beirut newspaper
Lissan Al-Hal which claimed that, ‘without the slightest shade of doubt’, the coup was
contrived by the PKI.61 He recalled the murder of Naustion’s daughter and ‘the
mutilated bodies of the six Muslim generals . . . who [were] dismembered, cut to small
bits and thrown in a well’. Whipping up feelings further, the newsreader said ‘Such
atrocities against Muslims . . . cannot but make the blood boil in every Muslim heart
. . . they open every Muslim eye to the dirty work which no communist lackey would
hesitate to do whenever the master dictates’. The British were working on similar lines.
The Foreign Office hoped to ‘encourage anti-Communist Indonesians to more
vigorous action in the hope of crushing Communism in Indonesia altogether’.62 The
Information Research Department would stimulate broadcasts to Indonesia by the
BBC, Radio Malaysia, Radio Australia and VOA. It would also try to disseminate
propaganda through newspapers read in Indonesia such as the Straits Times. The same
anti-PKI message was to be spread by more clandestine outlets, such as a ‘black
transmitter’ (presumably Radio Free Indonesia) and ‘IRD’s regular newsletter’, which
seems to have been ‘black’ propaganda prepared in Singapore by the Information
Research Department’s South East Asia Monitoring Unit.63 Suggested propaganda
themes included ‘PKI brutality in murdering Generals and families, Chinese
interference, particularly arms shipments, PKI subverting Indonesia as the agents of
foreign Communists’.64 On 9 October the Foreign Office reported that it was
mounting some ‘short term unattributable ploys designed to keep the Indonesian pot
boiling’.65
British propaganda efforts were strengthened by the arrival in November of Norman
Reddaway as Political Warfare Coordinator in Singapore. Reddaway received news on
the situation in Indonesia from the embassy in Jakarta and from intelligence sources,
which seem to have included signals intelligence, as Britain had broken the Indonesian
ciphers.66 He would then supply information that suited British purposes to news
agencies, newspapers and radio via contacts in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Hong
Kong. This news would be carried out into the world’s media and return to Indonesia,
allowing Britain to influence Indonesian opinion. The reports were designed to
damage the communists. A draft Foreign Office brief in late November explained that
Britain had been ‘blackening the PKI’s reputation within Indonesia and outside, by
feeding into the ordinary publicity media news from Indonesia that associates the PKI
and the Chinese with Untung’s treachery plus corresponding covert activity’. Thus,Q1
despite some private doubts over communist responsibility for the coup attempt, all
four Western powers used the media to pin the blame on the PKI and discredit the
party in Indonesia. This propaganda offensive supported the army’s own activities, as
the stories on VOA, Radio Malaysia, Radio Australia and the BBC and in the press
confirmed the stories in the army-controlled media. The synergy between the two
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publicity campaigns was not accidental. The British and Americans recycled reports
from Radio Jakarta or the army newspapers by broadcasting them back to Indonesia.67
For example, on 5 November the Jakarta Daily Mail claimed that on the day of the
coup 100 women from Gerwani had tortured one of the generals by using razor blades
and knives to slash his genitals before he was shot.68 In December an Information
Research Department official noted that this atrocity story would be included in the
South East Asia Monitoring Unit’s propaganda output.69
Furthermore the Indonesian army actively advised the Western powers on the
themes they should or should not use in their propaganda. On 2–3 November
Indonesian Brigadier-General Sukendro had secret talks in Bangkok with Dato Ghazali
Shafie, the Permanent Secretary at the Malaysian Ministry of External Affairs.70
Sukendro said that Radio Malaysia should not give the army ‘too much credit’ or
criticize Sukarno but should emphasize PKI atrocities and the party’s role in the coup.
Sukendro also asked for help in ‘the character and political assassination’ of Subandrio
and offered to send background information on the Foreign Minister which could be
used by the Malaysians. On 5 November an Indonesian military contact also
approached the Americans and warned them against broadcasts that implied approval
of army actions.71 An officer in the army information section told Shann that Radio
Australia should never suggest that the army was pro-Western or rightist and should
mention other organizations, such as Muslim and youth groups, opposing the PKI.72
As well as using propaganda against the PKI the Western powers helped the army in
other ways. The Americans set up a back-channel link to the army leaders through
Colonel Willis Ethel, the US Army Attache´ in Jakarta, who regularly met with an aide
to Naustion. Through this channel the Americans reassured the Indonesian army
about British activities and intentions, for although these two groups shared a
common interest in the removal of the communists, because of the Confrontation the
army was suspicious of Britain. The mistrust could reach ludicrous levels. In mid-
October Nasution’s aide quizzed Ethel about reports of British arms shipments to the
PKI and asked whether the coup could have been a plot by Britain and communist
China.73 To Washington these bizarre ideas showed the ‘somewhat naı¨ve international
view’ of the army leaders, but they genuinely seemed to suspect a conspiracy between
London and Beijing.74 Ethel had to assure them that Britain had not colluded with the
Chinese and the PKI.75
Ethel also gave a broader assurance that Britain would not escalate the
Confrontation while the army was dealing with the communists. With the approval
of London, on 14 October Ethel told Nasution’s aide that the British did not intend to
start any offensive military action.76 In early November the British and Australians
reinforced this message.77 Counsellor James Murray promised General Mokoginta, the
Commander of Indonesian Armed Forces in Sumatra, that Britain had no intention of
stepping up the Confrontation while the army was engaged with the PKI. Gilchrist and
Shann said the same thing to Helmi, an Under-Secretary at the Indonesian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs who was close to the army. Shann declared that the army ‘would
be completely safe in using their forces for whatever purpose they saw fit’.78
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The Indonesian army could suppress the communists without worrying about British
and Australian operations in the Confrontation.
In addition, the Americans secretly gave the army material aid. At the end of
October Sukendro asked the US for medical supplies, communications equipment,
rice and small arms to support the army’s campaign against the PKI.79 Washington
was willing to help but it knew that there were major political risks involved. If
American aid was exposed Sukarno and Subandrio would have proof of Nekolim
interference in Indonesian internal affairs and this would seriously embarrass both
the United States and the army. So the Americans moved carefully. On 12 November
the State Department informed the British and Australians that the US had agreed
to send $100,000-worth of medical supplies to the Indonesian army via covert
channels.80 The 303 Committee also agreed on 19 November to give the army
leaders a secure communications system, to maintain contact with each other and
with ‘U.S. elements’.81 In interviews in 1981–82 Sukendro confirmed that the US
had secretly supplied medicines, radios and small arms through the Bangkok CIA
station.82 Money may have been provided as well – in December Green
recommended a ‘black bag’ operation giving 50 million rupiahs to Adam Malik, a
key figure in KAP-Gestapu, an army-inspired action group that organized anti-PKI
demonstrations.83
Finally, the US supplied the army with intelligence.84 The American embassy in
Jakarta had compiled lists of names of the PKI leadership and senior cadres and,
according to Green, this information was superior to anything held by the Indonesian
army. After the coup attempt embassy officials passed on to the army lists of names of
known PKI leaders. The army could use this information to round up key communists
and dismantle the party structure.
The actions taken by the army in suppressing the communists did seem to
trouble the consciences of some of the Western ambassadors in Jakarta. In a
telegram to Canberra on 19 December Shann wrote that ‘In many cases the
massacre of entire families because one member spoke to the Communists, has
occurred. Some of the methods adopted are unspeakable . . . [It has been] a blood-
bath of savage intensity, remarkably unpublicised and locally regarded with a
ghoulish cynicism’.85 Gilchrist asked Reddaway in February 1966 ‘What have we to
hope from the [Indonesian] generals? 400,000 people murdered, far more than total
casualties in Vietnam þ nobody cares. “They were communists.” Were they? And are
communists not human beings?’86
Yet the massacre of thousands of communists did not affect Western policy. The
logic of the Cold War meant that the army was fulfilling the Western interest by
eliminating the PKI and removing the danger of Indonesia falling to communism. The
army was also the only means to dispose of Sukarno and end the Confrontation.
Therefore, despite distaste for the army’s methods, the West still wanted to support it.
The main problem for this policy was not ethical concerns but the fear that overt aid
could embarrass the army in its power struggle with Sukaro and Subandrio. On 1–2
December 1965 American, Australian, British and New Zealand officials held secret
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Quadripartite talks to coordinate policy towards Indonesia.87 The mass killings were
not even mentioned. Instead the officials discussed the difficulties in helping the army
while Sukarno and Subandrio remained in power. The West still had to take care not to
make the army appear to be Nekolim stooges and for this reason it was agreed at the
meeting that ‘except for some cautious propaganda (on lines already agreed) we
should take no initiative at this moment to help the Generals’.
There was another reason why the West would not offer greater aid, especially
economic aid: the army did not seem to want it. In November Sukendro had
raised the possibility of the US and Malaysia giving rice, which was in short supply
in some areas in Indonesia.88 But by the middle of December the army leaders
seemed to have abandoned this idea. On 13 December Malik told Green that there
was an urgent need for food and clothing in Indonesia but Suharto and Nasution
wanted to let Sukarno and Subandrio ‘stew in their own juice’.89 Economic
mismanagement hurt the civilian government, not the army, and if the situation
worsened Sukarno and Subandrio would be blamed. Malik advised the US not to
give aid yet.
Malik’s prediction about the effects of economic distress soon came true. To try and
rescue the floundering economy in mid-December Sukarno’s government devalued
the rupiah by an order of 1,000 and then quadrupled fuel prices in early January.90
These harsh fiscal measures provoked mass student protests. An Indonesian Student
Action Front, composed mainly of Muslim and nationalist students, organized
demonstrations. They linked economic discontent to political protest, demanding not
just a reduction in prices but also the removal of left-wing ministers, such as
Subandrio, and the formal banning of the PKI. The army gave covert assistance to the
students, transporting them to demonstrations and protecting them. The army leaders
saw the student protests as a way to undermine Sukarno’s rule and ease him and
Subandrio from office.
In their campaign the army and students again received propaganda support
from the West. Reddaway reported on 11 February that:
We have . . . stepped up our efforts. The Malaysian black radio is taking our tapes,
material written by us in Djakarta is appearing in Middle East Muslim newspapers
and being repeated by Radio Malaysia so that Indonesians hear it. The newsletter
undoubtedly continues to get through and be read. We pick up anti-Subandrio
propaganda circulated within Indonesia and get it published world-wide via news
agencies in Hong Kong.91
On 21 February Sukarno tried to reassert his authority by reshuffling his cabinet
and sacking Nasution as Defence Minister. But this move backfired. It triggered off
even larger student demonstrations, again abetted by the army, and on 11 March
troops mounted a show of force outside Sukarno’s palace. Under this pressure
Sukarno yielded and he signed a letter of authority handing over executive power to
Suharto. Although Sukarno remained nominally in charge real power was now in
the hands of the army.
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The Western allies were delighted with the army’s seizure of power. An
American official explained to President Johnson on 12 March that:
It is hard to overestimate the potential significance of the army’s apparent victory
over Sukarno (even though the latter remains as a figurehead). Indonesia has more
people – and probably more resources – than all of mainland Southeast Asia. It was
well on the way to becoming another expansionist Communist state, which would
have critically menaced the rear of the whole Western position in mainland
Southeast Asia. Now, though the unforeseen can always happen, this trend has been
sharply reversed.92
The pro-communist trend had indeed been reversed. During the remainder of 1966
and 1967 Suharto moved methodically to undo all of Sukarno’s policies. He banned
the PKI, detained Subandrio, ended Confrontation with Malaysia, rejoined the United
Nations and froze relations with communist China. Sukarno was stripped of his
remaining powers and died in obscurity. Indonesia was saved for the West.
The question remains of how far the Western powers were responsible for this
outcome. Did Western covert intervention in Indonesia cause the destruction of the
PKI and the removal of Sukarno? The origins of the coup attempt in October 1965
remain obscure but on the evidence from currently available American, Australian and
British archives it does not seem to have been a Western-inspired or -supported plot.
Certainly the West gave covert support to the army after the coup but it appears, as
Brands argues, that the indigenous actors were the key to events in Indonesia from
October 1965 to March 1966. It was the army that chose to crush the communists and
topple Sukarno’s government. While the attitude of the West may have encouraged the
army to move against the PKI it probably did not need much encouragement.
Nasution, for example, whose daughter had been murdered in the coup, had reasons
enough of his own. The United States did help the army by providing radios,
medicine, small arms and lists of names and by giving assurances that Britain would
not escalate the Confrontation, but this support was not essential to the army’s success.
Western propaganda may have been of more importance in bringing down
Sukarno’s regime and in inciting the massacre of the communists. The documentary
sources do, for example, corroborate a lot of Lashmar and Oliver’s revelations about
British covert propaganda operations in 1965–66. The influence of the West on the
anti-communist Terror should not be exaggerated though. The killings were not just
political acts in the Cold War, they were also a complex sociological phenomenon and
the perpetrators had a wide variety of local motives.93 The PKI had supported land
reform in rural areas and this had created bitter resentment between peasant party
members and small landlords. Muslims and, in Bali, Hindus were driven by religious
fervour to slaughter the atheist communists. The killings sometimes had racial
overtones, such as attacks on ethnic Chinese in North Sumatra. In the frenzy of
violence people saw a chance to satisfy personal vendettas. Other factors than
propaganda drove civilians to murder suspected communists. The killings were not




It can also be questioned how large the audience for Western propaganda actually
was. Australian officials believed that the only about 60 per cent of the adult
Indonesian population was literate and the number of newspaper readers was thought
to be just 500,000.94 Radio was a more important source of news but the number of
listeners was still limited. Radio Indonesia estimated in 1963 that there were 3.5
million radio sets in the country with an effective listenership of 17 million, but this
might have been an underestimate, as one radio set could be listened to by a large
number in a small village which had no other sources of information.
Of the foreign radio stations Radio Australia was generally agreed to be the most
popular, indeed an army officer told the Australians in September 1965 that Radio
Australia was more popular than Radio Indonesia.95 It was listened to by the elite –
Nasution was said to be a regular listener – and by students, who liked it because it
played rock music, which had been officially banned in Indonesia. The BBC
Indonesian service had far fewer listeners and was dismissed in an Information
Research Department report in June 1965 as being ‘probably only of marginal value’.96
Voice of America suffered from having a weak signal and was difficult to hear.97 Green
complained to Washington on 19 October 1965 about the ‘appalling inadequacy of
VOA signal to Indonesia’ and called for emergency measures to give a clear
reception.98 Radio Malaysia was audible, but in the opinion of Gilchrist it was not
trusted by Indonesians and therefore had no great influence.99 The audiences of the
West’s covert propaganda outlets are impossible to gauge, but judging by the relatively
few newspaper readers and radio listeners in Indonesia, Western propaganda may have
only been able to reach and affect a limited number of people.
Nevertheless, there are signs that Western propaganda may have had an impact. The
Indonesian government seemed to notice the propaganda campaign and feel
threatened by it. In a speech in January 1966 Sukarno declared those unhappy with his
leadership should say so openly and ‘not carry out campaigns of secret slander inspired
by Nekolim to bring about his downfall’.100 In February an editorial in the Indonesian
Herald newspaper, which acted as the mouthpiece for Subandrio’s Foreign Ministry,
warned of a ‘Necolim psywar’ being used to ‘subdue our revolution’.101Q2
On the other side, British officials believed that their propaganda had been effective.
Gilchrist wrote in April 1966 that military and political propaganda pressure on
Indonesia ‘has had no small effect in breaking up the Soekarno regime’.102 Reportedly,
Sir John Grandy, the British Commander in Chief in the Far East, thought Reddaway’s
propaganda work ‘made an outstanding contribution to the campaign against the
Indonesians’.103
The explanations ordinary Indonesians gave for the massacres also appeared to
show the influence of propaganda. Western journalists travelling in Java and Bali in the
spring and summer of 1966 observed that people repeatedly justified the killings as
self-defence. Seymour Topping wrote in the New York Times that ‘Many Indonesians
say bluntly “It was them or us”’.104 He heard rumours in the towns of the PKI digging
mass graves prior to the coup and PKI files naming high-ranking army officers, local
officials and religious leaders that were to be executed. Stanley Karnow reported in
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the Washington Post that ‘Everywhere . . . people sought to justify the destruction of the
Communists with the same phrase “If we hadn’t done it to them they would have done
it to us”’.105 He believed this pervasive attitude was largely due to the ‘the brutal
fashion in which the Communists murdered [the] six army generals’. Dennis Warner,
quoted an Indonesian in The Sydney Morning Herald as saying ‘I think the murder of
the generals and Nasution’s daughter had such an impact on us all, especially when we
learnt what was in store for the rest of us, that no one had any sympathy for the PKI’.106
Clearly, some of the themes of the propaganda campaign are present here but there
is a difficulty in separating out the effects of internal army propaganda from Western
propaganda, as both were conveying the same message. It is likely that Western
propaganda played a secondary, supporting role. The news coming from abroad would
have confirmed the stories Indonesians were hearing at home – that the PKI had
masterminded the coup, that communist women tortured and murdered the six
generals, that the communists had planned to massacre their enemies. Western
propaganda helped build up the picture of the communists as menacing, bloodthirsty
killers that needed to be eradicated. The impact of this campaign was to dehumanize
the communists and make it easier to murder them. As one Indonesian civilian, who
executed 18 communists, put it to a journalist in 1966 ‘I did not kill people. I killed
wild animals’.107 To this extent Western covert intervention may have encouraged the
massacres in Indonesia in the winter of 1965–66.
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